It’s the same old story: the military steps in with the stated purpose of responding to an emergency, but once they get hold of power, they start extending the timelines of transition, prolonging their stay until further notice.

In Mali, the coup that ousted President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta came in August 2020, after two months of sustained protests over flawed legislative elections, alleged corruption, insecurity and the government’s handling of the pandemic.

As in other Central and West African countries that have experienced military coups since, many people, including in the political opposition and civil society, welcomed the coup, hoping the military would make some quick fixes and then hand power to elected civilians.

That’s what Mali’s coup leaders initially promised, with a plan for an 18-month transition culminating in elections in February 2022. In September 2020, they set up a transitional government with a mix of civilian and military personnel. Possibly as a result of international pressure, the appointed president and prime minister were civilians.

It didn’t last. In May 2021, when President Bah N’daw tried to change his cabinet, including by replacing two coup leaders, he was arrested and dismissed, along with the prime minister and defence minister. Coup leader Assimi Goïta took command and filled most key positions with military personnel. The only major exception was Choguel Kokalla Maïga, a civilian opposition leader, who became ‘prime minister of the transition’.

But the transition never happened. Four years have passed and there’s no indication of elections any time soon. Instead, the military regime has moved in the opposite direction, consolidating its power by suspending the activities of political parties and civil society organisations (CSOs). Civil society continues to push for democracy, but to succeed it needs all the support it can get.

Civil society in the crossfire

Several former French colonies have recently distanced themselves from France, and Mali’s no exception. Much of the sense of relief the coup brought came from belief the military would be better at tackling insecurity. But pro-coup mobilisations also expressed simmering anger at the French military presence in Mali, a vestige of colonial times that left a lasting legacy of poverty, instability and economic dependency – and one all the more galling because of its ineffectiveness in quelling jihadist insurgent violence, which instead continued to spread.

In 2021, France announced it would gradually withdraw its troops from Mali, likely to be replaced by an international force. But things moved fast as relations deteriorated. In January 2022, Mali expelled the French ambassador, and in March, France announced it was withdrawing because the government was obstructing its operations.

The Malian government doubled down, insisting withdrawal should take place as soon as possible. Meanwhile, it announced the suspension of the French media outlets France24 and Radio France Internationale for publishing what it said were false and unfounded allegations of human rights abuses committed by the Malian armed forces, violations also condemned by international human rights organisations and the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights. The authorities banned local news outlets broadcasting content produced by the suspended French media. Their suspension became ‘definitive‘ at the end of April.

Junta leaders publicly smeared several journalists as ‘liars’ and ‘manipulators’ and the authorities made it harder for foreign media correspondents to get accreditation. At least one French journalist working for Jeune Afrique was arrested and deported to France within a day of arriving in Bamako, Mali’s capital.

By August 2022, there were no French soldiers left in Mali. This created an opening for the Wagner Group, a private organisation that would soon be taken over by Vladimir Putin. French forces were replaced by Russian mercenaries, who face credible allegations of serious human rights abuses wherever they operate.

In late 2022, France announced the suspension of its aid to the Malian government, which it had already significantly reduced. However, French support to CSOs was expected to continue.

But in retaliation, the junta banned the activities of Malian CSOs that received support from France. This made it much more difficult for civil society to do its work, from helping those affected by insurgency, which has so far displaced some 1.26 million people, to holding the state accountable.

Civic space under attack

Shortly afterwards, the junta announced new measures to control CSOs that had nothing to do with its dispute with France; they were simply designed to stifle dissent and consolidate military power. CSOs now must have their finances approved by the Minister of Territorial Administration, on a monthly basis for foreign organisations and annually for those from Mali. The junta introduced new reporting requirements and announced a commission for the ‘coordination, evaluation, monitoring and control of associations and NGOs’.

A ministerial decree of 15 December 2022 banned the Swiss humanitarian organisation Geneva Call, accusing it of being involved in ‘illegal activities’, without giving any details. The real reason may have been that the group had invited former rebels from the Coordination of Azawad Movements, a coalition of Tuareg pro-independence and Arab nationalist groups, to Geneva to sign an ‘act of commitment’ to humanitarian law and the protection of health workers.

The junta further targeted the media. In November 2022, the national media regulatory authority imposed a two-month suspension on Joliba TV News for alleged breaches of journalistic ethics. The decision came weeks after the TV channel was formally accused of making ‘defamatory statements’ after one of its journalists criticised Maïga’s speech at the UN and warned that freedom of expression was at risk in Mali.

Civil society activists face acute risk of repression. Aminata Cheick Dicko was threatened after speaking at the UN Security Council in January 2023 and forced into hiding. At the meeting, which discussed the future of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), she condemned the Wagner Group’s abuses. Social media trolls accused her of working for the enemy, collaborating with jihadists and being used by the west to destroy Mali. The Collective for the Defence of the Military (CDM), a group close to the junta, said it had filed a legal complaint against her for ‘defamation, slander and high treason’. She received threats and now fears for her life.

Journalists increasingly feel vulnerable. Malick Konaté has regularly received threats since the coup, but these escalated after he appeared in a French TV documentary about mercenaries linked to the Wagner Group. He was labelled a ‘traitor’ and ‘Mali’s public enemy number 1’ on social media. The CDM said he’d been ‘irresponsible’ and had committed ‘an act of high treason’. Konaté received a call from the police saying he was ‘needed’ and military officers visited his home twice.

Vlogger Rokia Doumbia, anti-corruption activist and academic Clément Dembélé, religious leaders Bandiougou Traoré and Chouala Bayaya Haïdara and journalists Mohamed Youssouf Bathily and Abdoul Niang are among many others criminalised for their opinions.

Journalists have also been victims of insurgency. In November 2023, one journalist was killed, another wounded and two kidnapped when armed men attacked their vehicle in northern Mali. Following the attack, journalists in the region declared a ‘day without radio’, suspending their broadcasts. Another journalist was held by a jihadist group for almost two years before being released in March 2023.

Military power consolidated

After taking power, Colonel Goïta began to backtrack on the promise of elections. First he said national consultations were needed before elections could be called. The junta organised some public discussions in late 2021 and, on the basis of alleged input it never disclosed, said it might hold elections at some point in 2025. Under pressure from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), it eventually promised to hold elections and hand power back to civilians by March 2024.

But instead of organising elections, the junta rewrote the constitution. In June 2023, it held a referendum to approve constitutional amendments that the democratic opposition criticised as giving the president too much power. Under the new constitution, the president has the right to set policy and hire and fire the prime minister and cabinet members, and the government is accountable to the president rather than to parliament. With a low turnout of just under 40 per cent, 97 per cent of voters approved the changes, according to hard-to-verify official figures.

Having secured his new powers, the interim president unilaterally postponed the elections again in September, citing ‘technical reasons‘. The authorities announced no new dates and quickly punished the most vocal opponents of this move. In December they forcefully dissolved Elections and Good Governance Observatory, a CSO, claiming it couldn’t properly account for its funding sources and wasn’t complying with the new reporting requirements. They also accused its president, Ibrahima Sangho, of making statements that could ‘disturb public order’. Sango had predicted a low referendum turnout and insisted elections could and should be held before March 2024.

The junta has also targeted political parties that urged elections. In June 2023, a Bamako court ordered the dissolution of the African Social Democratic Party after finding it guilty of ‘disturbing public order’ and ‘attacking national sovereignty’. The government initiated the process after the party’s exiled leader, Ismaël Sacko, criticised the junta’s management of the transition. In December, another opposition party, African Solidarity for Democracy and Independence, received a court summons threatening it with dissolution over statements made by its exiled leader, Oumar Mariko, which were deemed to be ‘discrediting the State’.

The crackdown has extended to pro-junta political parties and leaders who’ve dared to step out of line for criticising the postponement of elections, the security situation or human rights abuses. They’ve also been subjected to arbitrary detention, judicial harassment and prosecution. Adama Ben Diarra, a member of the transitional military council and leader of the anti-French and anti-MINUSMA movement Yerewolo Débout sur les Remparts, was convicted and sentenced to two years in prison, with one year suspended, for ‘undermining the credibility of the State’ after calling for respect for the transition plan and criticising arbitrary arrests.

No loose ends

The military junta’s international realignment has seen it turn its back on sources of accountability. In February 2023, the Malian diplomatic corps declared Guillaume Ngefa, head of the human rights section of MINUSMA, persona non grata. He was accused of speaking to ‘impostors claiming to represent Malian civil society, while ignoring national authorities and institutions’, and told to leave the country. In June, the military authorities demanded the UN withdraw its peacekeeping force, saying it hadn’t responded effectively to Mali’s security challenges. MINUSMA left Mali on 31 December.

In January 2024, Mali’s junta, together with those of Burkina Faso and Niger, issued a statement announcing their decision to withdraw immediately from ECOWAS. The three accused the organisation, which suspended the countries following their coups and imposed sanctions on Mali and Niger, of acting ‘under the influence of foreign powers’. The move, sold under the guise of national self-determination, was greeted with street rallies. As an alternative to ECOWAS, Mali committed itself to regional cooperation with fellow authoritarians in the Alliance of Sahel States.

The next step came on 10 April. About a week after over 20 political parties and civil society groups issued a joint statement calling on the authorities to hold elections ‘as soon as possible’, the junta suspended ‘until further notice’ the activities of all political parties and associations. The next day, the communications regulatory body ordered all media to stop ‘broadcasting and publishing’ about them. Officially, they don’t exist anymore.

Now it’s up to international partners and democratic allies to help them continue their vital work. Since the first coup nearly five years ago, civil society has been working to restore democracy. It has denounced security failures and human rights abuses. It has worked for peace, promoted dialogue and provided humanitarian aid. Despite the ongoing crackdown on dissent, it has continued to protest against the postponement of elections and demand accountability. The future would look much bleaker if it weren’t for civil society. If Malian activists and organisations don’t get enough support to continue playing their roles and preserve their space, there won’t be a democratic transition any time soon.

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