CIVICUS discusses Myanmar’s upcoming election with Nyein, a human rights advocate and researcher with the Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma (ALTSEAN-Burma). ALTSEAN-Burma is a regional network established in 1996 to promote human rights, democracy and justice in Myanmar through training, resource development and international advocacy. It serves as a bridge between grassroots activists and international forums, ensuring that local perspectives reach decision-makers.

Myanmar’s military junta plans to hold a general election in 2025, four years after deposing the elected civilian government. While the regime frames this as democratic progress, opposition groups rightly reject it as a cynical attempt to legitimise military rule. The 2024 census was met with violent resistance, with attacks on census workers underscoring the junta’s limited control of territory. Critics anticipate the election will be similarly marred by violence, particularly targeting those associated with the military. Despite the regime’s claims that it will ensure security during the election, its control is demonstrably weakening, leading many to predict its eventual collapse.

Does the election offer any potential for political change?

The prospects for real political change are extremely bleak. In 2023, the junta-controlled Union Election Commission dissolved over 40 political parties, including deposed leader Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy. The few parties allowed to compete in the upcoming election represent just 2.7 per cent of parliamentary seats won in 2020. The regime also holds around 21,900 political prisoners, with 11,500 still awaiting sentencing. All of this points to the planned election being nothing more than an attempt by junta leader General Min Aung Hlaing to cling to power.

The junta maintains this grip despite suffering repeated military setbacks against resistance forces. The failed 2024 census exposed its lack of control: enumerators were able to reach only 44 per cent of Burma’s townships, leaving 19.1 million people unaccounted for.

When unable to maintain control on the ground, the junta resorts to aerial attacks predominantly targeting civilians. In 2024, air and drone strikes killed more civilians than in the previous three years combined. With troop numbers dwindling due to deaths, desertion and defection, in early 2024 the junta imposed an illegal draft seeking to forcibly conscript around 40,000 young people.

How severe is the humanitarian crisis in conflict-affected regions?

The humanitarian and human rights situation is dire. At least 13,500 people have been killed and over 3.25 million have been displaced, with numbers continuing to rise. Reports of waterborne illnesses are increasing, and in November 2024 the United Nations Development Programme warned that close to two million people in Arakan (Rakhine) State faced famine. Overall, over 20 million people now require humanitarian aid, with as many as 15 million expected to face hunger in 2025.

The junta has weaponised aid by deliberately blocking supplies and targeting local aid workers, a trend that was highlighted again after the deadly Typhoon Yagi in September 2024. Assistance from neighbouring countries following this and other disasters was largely channelled through the Myanmar Red Cross Society, widely viewed as an extension of the regime.

Meanwhile, junta forces continue to attack schools, healthcare facilities and places of worship, while also carrying out executions and mutilations and using civilians as human shields. Women and girls remain particularly vulnerable to sexual and gender-based violence.

In Arakan State, Rohingya civilians are caught between the junta and the rapidly expanding Arakan Army. When the Arakan Army seized Buthidaung in May, more than 150,000 Rohingya people were displaced, and in August shelling and drone strikes killed at least 180 fleeing civilians in Maungdaw. As the junta weakens, the overall humanitarian crisis and human rights abuses continue to worsen.

How has civil society adapted its work under military rule?

Despite the oppressive conditions imposed by the regime, civil society has persisted. Many activists were forced into exile after the coup but continue to work closely with colleagues in Burma to document human rights violations while facing constant threats from the junta.

Forced conscription has placed activists in Burma in greater danger, but even those who have managed to escape are not entirely safe, as crackdowns have spread to neighbouring countries such as Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. In Thailand, for example, authorities are actively searching for human rights activists with Starlink devices, under the pretence of cracking down on online scam operations.

Despite the challenges, technological advances have enabled activists to work more effectively. They have learned from past experiences, adapted to new communication methods and built robust alliances with women’s organisations, LGBTQI+ groups and ethnic minorities, including Rohingya activists.

What role is China playing in Myanmar?

China’s sole interest in Myanmar lies in protecting its strategic and economic interests, particularly those linked to the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and other Belt and Road Initiative projects. The junta’s blatant disregard for human rights, labour rights and environmental protections has allowed large-scale projects to operate with little to no oversight, leaving affected communities voiceless.

Beijing backs the junta in the hope the regime can create the illusion of stability necessary for Chinese projects to move forward. In a provocative move, China has even proposed forming a joint security firm with the junta to protect its projects, which blatantly undermines Burma’s sovereignty. Moreover, China is pressuring Burma’s neighbours to accept the junta’s sham election as a legitimate political solution.

Yet China’s current course of action appears more like an emotional, short-term reaction rather than a calculated strategy that aligns with its long-term interests. The junta’s destabilising actions do not serve China’s broader economic or security objectives, as well as disregarding the aspirations of Burmese people and their fundamental human rights.

What steps should the international community take to support peace and democracy in Myanmar?

Genuine peacebuilding must prioritise inclusion, equality and justice and involve all stakeholders. The anti-junta resistance is not interested in mere ceasefires that fail to address the underlying issues, but in a lasting political transformation that protects civilians and delivers comprehensive social, political and economic justice.

Civil society urgently needs support, as funding shortages are endangering exiled groups and placing activists inside Burma at even greater risk. The international community must address the gaps left by the Trump administration’s cuts to foreign aid, recognising that the junta’s sham election cannot pave the way for real political change and should not be legitimised.

Sanctions remain a critical tool in this struggle. The regime’s ability to acquire arms, equipment and aviation fuel enables its ongoing human rights abuses. Its increasing reliance on drones, propeller-driven aircraft and paragliders underscores the effectiveness of aviation fuel sanctions, which must be maintained and reinforced. To curb its financial power, coordinated sanctions should target key institutions such as the Central Bank of Myanmar, the Myanma Foreign Trade Bank, the Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank and the Myanma Economic Bank.