‘If civil society doesn’t speak now, we risk having nothing left to defend in just a couple of years’
CIVICUS discusses Turkey’s ongoing protests with Rümeysa Çamdereli, Research Director of the YADA foundation, a civil society organisation (CSO) that works to strengthen civil society’s impact. Rümeysa also co-founded Havle Women’s Association, Turkey’s first Muslim feminist CSO.
The recent arrest of Ekrem İmamoğlu, Istanbul’s mayor and the opposition’s presidential candidate for the next general elections, triggered the biggest wave of protests Turkey has seen since the 2013 Gezi Park protests. Starting in Istanbul and quickly spreading to dozens of cities, the protests have brought together an unprecedented coalition of students, workers, opposition politicians and first-time protesters. What began as spontaneous gatherings has evolved into coordinated nationwide actions involving millions of people demanding İmamoğlu’s release and calling for judicial independence, democratic accountability and an end to political persecution. The government’s heavy-handed response has only intensified public outrage.
What does İmamoğlu’s arrest reveal about the state of Turkish democracy?
İmamoğlu’s arrest represents the culmination of a process of democratic erosion that began around 2010. Over the past decade, the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) government has grown increasingly conservative and authoritarian, systematically dismantling democratic safeguards.
The criminalisation of the 2013 Gezi Park protests – with prominent figures such as Osman Kavala still imprisoned – established a pattern of suppressing dissent that directly connects to İmamoğlu’s case. More recently, Turkey’s unilateral withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention – the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence – without public consultation marked another critical turning point.
The timing of İmamoğlu’s arrest is particularly telling. While previous political arrests typically occurred near elections, İmamoğlu’s early detention suggests a calculated strategy to eliminate any viable opposition well before the next presidential race. This pre-emptive move potentially signals an even more repressive phase in Turkish politics.
How have the protests evolved?
Though the initial explosive energy has subsided, resistance has transformed rather than disappeared. It has diversified beyond centralised demonstrations into multifaceted forms of civic action. The opposition Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) organises nationwide meetings, while student groups create alternative protest spaces, such as a recent concert in Kadıköy.
What’s remarkable is how resistance has permeated everyday life. It’s no longer confined to street protests but manifests in daily acts of defiance. People contribute through various channels, including institutional organising, economic boycotts, artistic expression and digital activism. This diffusion makes the movement more resilient and harder to suppress.
How are young people reshaping protest tactics?
Young activists are revolutionising Turkey’s protest landscape through strategic innovation. They’ve pioneered economic boycotts that leverage consumer power against regime-aligned businesses, a particularly potent strategy in Turkey’s fragile economy.
Their approach to anonymity reflects both sophistication and necessity. Many mask themselves not merely symbolically but out of legitimate fear for their future employment prospects. They understand the surveillance state’s capabilities and protect their identities while still making their voices heard.
What distinguishes this youth movement is its decentralised, non-institutional character. Young protesters aren’t necessarily part of political organisations or civil society groups. Rather than by ideology, they are united by shared grievances, from economic injustice to gender-based violence and the erosion of the rule of law. Young women particularly emphasise their personal experiences with harassment and systemic injustice, highlighting the collapse of legal protection.
This generation embodies a powerful paradox: they feel they have nothing to lose yet remain deeply invested in fighting for Turkey’s future. Their combination of pragmatic tactics and principled defiance offers valuable lessons for protest movements globally.
How are CSOs supporting the protests?
CSOs face a dilemma in today’s Turkey. While some organisations like ours actively campaign for accountability, many remain troublingly silent. This silence stems largely from financial vulnerability: over the past few years international funding has plummeted, forcing many CSOs to rely on private sector support that shuns political controversy.
This has effectively muzzled organisations that should function as society’s democratic compass. There’s a growing sense that if civil society doesn’t speak now, we risk having nothing left to defend in just a couple of years. Turkey may cross a point of no return, where no independent civic space remains.
At the YADA Foundation, we’ve responded by launching our Civil Society for Democracy campaign, which has gathered 80 organisational signatories so far. Beyond statements, we’re also developing a strategic framework with a list of clear demands to help civil society reclaim its voice and leverage collective power for systemic change.
How are feminist and LGBTQI+ movements navigating these protests?
This protest movement presents unique challenges for feminist and LGBTQI+ activists. Unlike the progressive, inclusive spirit of the Gezi Park demonstrations, the current protests have brought together a much broader group of people and in a way, they reflect mainstream Turkish society, including its sexism, militarism and homophobia. Many protesters feature regressive language and behaviour that create hostile environments for excluded groups.
Nevertheless, feminist and LGBTQI+ movements persist in carving out space. Their popular slogan ‘men, welcome to the streets’ pointedly reminds newcomers that these movements have been fighting authoritarian policies long before it became a mainstream concern.
What’s fascinating is witnessing many first-time protesters – particularly men who previously felt insulated from government overreach – experiencing a political awakening. For them, this is less an ideological stance than a visceral recognition that their rights are also at risk. Feminist and LGBTQI+ organisations play a crucial role in channelling this energy toward more inclusive politics, helping transform personal grievances into principled commitment to democratic and inclusive values.
Could these protests fundamentally alter Turkey’s political trajectory?
Yes, change may come, and it may happen sooner than the scheduled 2028 election, as momentum for early elections by 2026 is building rapidly. The CHP’s campaign for İmamoğlu’s release has already mobilised an unprecedented 15 million supporters, with a target of 30 million signatures. This grassroots pressure represents a citizen-driven demand for democratic restoration within the constraints of Turkey’s institutional framework, which offers few legal channels for such demands.
Realistically, democracy won’t return overnight. The current regime has embedded itself deeply within state and economic structures, including the judiciary, media, security apparatus and business networks. They don’t merely govern; they’ve captured the system. Even with a change in leadership, dismantling these entrenched power networks will require a lot of time and effort. İmamoğlu’s experience in Istanbul illustrates this challenge: despite his mayoral election win, the AKP-controlled municipal council obstructed his initiatives until well into his second term.
Nevertheless, we’re witnessing the emergence of something transformative. People have experienced the possibility of change, creating momentum that cannot be easily reversed. Whether this leads to fundamental democratic renewal or merely symbolic victories remains uncertain, but there are genuine grounds for hope.